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Title: The Impartial Need of Joint Audits 
  
Background and Problem: Since the financial crisis, it has become of greater importance to 
secure audit quality, and there is an ongoing discussion concerning the matter of how to assure 
that auditors do contribute to a higher level of financial stability. Joint audit is mandatory in 
France and has been mandatory in Denmark and Sweden up until recently. Moreover, the 
stakeholders rely on highly qualitative financial information in the financial reports in order to 
make well informed decisions.  
  
Purpose of Study: The purpose is to investigate how a firm’s accounting quality is linked to joint 
audit. The study is carried out in accordance with the many stakeholders’ interest in minimizing 
information asymmetry and acquiring impartial financial reports. Is the application of an 
additional auditor a higher accounting quality assertion? 
  
Boundaries: Firstly, no assessment is projected to separate a firm using two audit teams from 
the same or different firms. Also, there are various ways to measure accounting quality and the 
cause for certain results in accounting quality can be due to many external factors, which have 
not been investigated. 
 
Methodology: From our elaborated sample on the top largest Swedish firms (developed by 
revenue) we use a quantitative method and earlier developed equations where joint audit is a 
dichotomous variable, to calculate the relationship between joint audit and accounting quality. 
 
Results and Conclusions: We state that our conclusions are of the same quality as the quality 
of the method. On the basis that accounting quality has been measured by addressing income 
smoothing and SPOS. This study discovers that joint audit is negatively linked to accounting 
quality through a more frequent use of income smoothing and a higher tendency to manipulate 
earnings by the statistically significant positive correlation between SPOS and joint audit. This 
implies that applying joint audit does not mean that the accounting quality is elevated. 
 
Future Studies: We wish to inspire further studies on whether there are other factors that 
provoke the need for an additional audit team. Research could be subjected again to Swedish 
firms to confirm our results. This research should then concern a wider span of accounting 
quality proxies in addition to a larger sample. 
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1 Introduction 
The first chapter introduces the study and presents a background to the importance of accounting quality 
(abbreviated AQ). The section’s purpose of the study: together with the problem discussion, discharge into 
the research question: how accounting quality is linked to joint audit. The chapter ends with boundaries of 
the research, definitions of important expressions and the disposition of the study.  
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
Financial reports are prerequisites for the ongoing concern of a business and of importance for 
our ongoing everyday life. And these reports are undoubtedly of importance in order to live up to 
expectations of high quality for readability, comparability and reliability for stakeholders. 
Asserting closer scrutiny on these reports moreover could improve accounting quality. Certain 
events in the not very distant past have contributed to changes in the climate of presenting 
financial reports. Events like for instance subprime loans in the United States up until 2008 and 
the Kreuger incident in the 1930s that was a milestone and reshaped regulations on for example 
consolidation in Sweden (Jönsson, 1991). In the Kreuger incident, stakeholders were negatively 
affected when their investments were dissolved. The lesson thereafter was the understanding of 
the need to minimize risks for investors, hence scrutinized disclosure of the group (Jönsson, 
1991).  
 
Further on, corporate governance is a subject that is addressed in this study on the topic of 
accounting quality. Corporate governance can be addressed with differing definitions depending 
on the chosen viewpoint. Aguilera and Jackson (2010) suggest that corporate governance could 
be defined broadly as the study of power and influence over decision making within the firm. In 
this study, corporate governance is intended to discuss what decisions managers make and how 
these decisions affect the financial reports and hence in extension also affect investors’ 
investment decisions, interest rates, equity ratio etcetera. Since these two parties pursue private 
means and act on their own personal self-interest, an obvious information asymmetry arises. 
One way to externally control for these differing requirements of information is to employ third-
party auditors to certify reliable and to a higher degree impartial information presented in the 
financial statements.  
 
Through this study we wish to expand the research and discussion on the topic of joint audits, 
primarily reflecting and discussing what the effects are. Joint audit is the process where two 
audit teams perform audit for a firm. A goal is contributing and encouraging to further research 
on the connection between joint audit and the quality of accounting. The topic is scrutiny and 
avoiding misinformation and opening up to straightforward communication without hidden 
agendas or questionable results and financial reports. The goal would be an open industry 
where no secrets are too big to tell. Many previous studies focus on analyzing audit quality and 
joint audit, whereas we provide another dimension by subjecting the quality of accounting to the 
analysis. Prior studies give a variety of opinions on the subject of joint audit. Some present 
positive findings on joint audit like Mazars (2010), Bisogno and De Luca (2016), and Andrè, 
Broye, Pong and Schatt (2009) to mention a few, while some are opposing and claim that joint 
audit cause free rider problems and do not live up to good enough effects, (Neveling, 2007) or a 
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comparison between the audit quality derived from two Big 4 or only one Big 4 firm (Deng, Lu, 
Simunic and Ye, 2014).  
1.2 Background  
Since the financial crisis, it has become of greater importance to secure audit quality, and there 
is an ongoing discussion concerning the matter of how to assure that auditors contribute to a 
higher level of financial stability. As the European Commission addresses the topic in their 
Green Paper; Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis (2010).  
 
“Robust audit is key to re-establishing trust and market confidence; it contributes to investor 
protection and reduces the cost of capital for companies” 
 
Humphrey, Kausar, Loft and Woods (2011) also critically discuss the problematic question of 
how to adopt a high quality audit environment by regulatory means. Furthermore, according to 
an article on the website of the professional membership organization ICAEW (Martindale, 
2015), regulators and governments have had an interest in creating environments where there 
are no opportunities to knowingly or, otherwise overstate the financial statements. Nor disguise 
poor performance of the firm. 
 
Moreover, as presented by Ball, Robin and Wu (2003), “High quality [accounting] standards do 
not imply high quality reporting”. It is stated that accounting information and the quality of this 
information is underlying the financial statements of the firms. When auditing disclose 
information in annual reports, it is of importance that the accounting information reflects a high 
quality summary of the firm’s current situation.  
 
Joint audit is a phenomenon present in France for publicly listed firms that prepare group 
financial reports (Francis, Richard and Vanstraelen 2009), in Denmark joint audit was mandatory 
until 2005 (Holm and Thinggaard 2014) and in Sweden, banks were obliged to adopt joint audit 
(Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen and Niemi, 2012).  In all of the previous cases, it was required by 
law for a firm to be jointly audited by two independent auditors. It is obvious that asserting high 
quality in a firm’s financial statements is of importance to legislators, yet not unanimous. 
Deciding whether a higher level of scrutiny and to which degree it actually is improving the 
quality of financial statements is inconclusive according to various international prior studies 
(Zerni et al., 2012; Bisogno and De Luca, 2016; et cetera). Our study hence examines the 
voluntary choice of applying joint audit within Swedish firms. It has been found interesting to 
analyze the presence of joint audit among Swedish firms since there has not been a wide range 
of research within the Swedish context of joint audit. 
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1.3 Purpose of the Study and Problem Discussion 
Not only do the actors of the stock market rely on high quality financial statements but also 
stakeholders in terms of macroeconomics in the sense that basically all activity in society is 
dependent on one another as the theme of the ongoing concern. The sole existence of firms on 
the market that need to be competitive, calls for attentive financial statements. For an efficient 
market, it is of high importance that only wealthy and auspicious firms are present, offering a 
certain level of supply and demand. If financial reports would not fulfill a reasonable degree of 
quality, it can be hurtful to the system in the long run. An efficient market, moreover, driven by 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, supplies and demands various goods and services in between 
clients, distributors, suppliers etcetera. Now, if a particular distributor were suffering from lower 
accounting quality, and did not identify its ominous insolvency issue arising, setbacks could be 
caused for its stakeholders. What would be the best way to handle this lack of safety? Could 
problems related to accountancy be diminished and hence a higher accounting quality be 
attained.  
 
Audit in general can be seen as both costly and efficient, mostly depending on the size of the 
firm. A larger firm with a higher amount of money and power is of greater interest due to the 
larger number of stakeholders involved. Joint audit is at a first glance costlier since twice the job 
is performed but this is a point where research is not unanimous (Francis et al., 2009; Andrè et 
al., 2009). But how to assure that scrutiny is undertaken and resulting in higher quality of 
auditing and accounting? Is a result of two people working on the same task of higher quality? 
And along with rising complexity in governance and finance among organizations, objectivity is 
of importance for stakeholders to make well informed decisions. The contribution of this paper to 
currently existing research is the adding of joint audit to the equation of accounting quality. This 
study presents results reached from the Swedish context which is rarely present in previous 
studies. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the connection between a firm’s accounting quality 
and joint audit. It is important that the firm’s financial statements acquire a high quality in order 
for the financial statements to be a proper basis for investors when making an investment 
decision. As an investor, without access to inside information, it is of essence to rely on the 
accuracy of information assembled in the annual report. A further investigation of whether the 
presence of joint audit increases or decreases the quality of accounting will be made. 
 
1.3.1 Research question 
This study aims to answer the following question: 
 
“How is accounting quality linked to joint audit?” 
 
1.4 Research boundaries 
There are certain limits to this study, which are presented in this section. Some areas were 
desired to examine but unfortunately deemed outside the scope of this study. 
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Firstly, we do not take into account how the joint audit was performed referring to what exact 
assignments the two audit teams performed. For example, it is considered of non-significant 
relevance whether two teams jointly revised the same assignments independently or if the 
assignments were split and each separate data was scrutinized by only one team. Though this 
circumstance could add an additional level of quality to the study, but the data is not available to 
our chosen method of research. 
 
Secondly, regarding accounting quality, since the difficulty to apply a single and one sided 
definition of accounting quality, we have made a fine selection of a few proxies that we argue are 
suitable for this study. We argue for suitable proxies acclaimed in previous research. Important 
proxies outside the scope of this study were cash flow-related income smoothing correlated with 
accruals, such as the accrual and cash flow Spearman correlation used in Barth, Landsman and 
Lang (2008). Furthermore, no relationship has been measured between accounting quality and 
the subsequent stock price as performed by Barth et al., (2008). 
 
Finally, accounting quality is disputable regarding what factors are the determinants of 
accounting quality. Accounting quality is most probably the effect of several decisions. It would 
be narrow-mindedly to allege the few reasons as earnings management. There could also be 
external factors affecting such as reverse causality issues, and volatile currencies for 
internationally trading firms that show fluctuating results from one year to another but is not 
controllable for the managers, which are not tested in this study. And on the other hand, since 
regulations could be changed every now and then, accounting quality is hence subjective. 
Maybe accounting quality is not the best measure, but other alternative measures such as 
economic income (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012) based on cash flow rather than accruals 
and prudence concept conservatism. 
1.5 Definitions 
This section includes four important aspects of this study that are needed to be defined to 
simplify for the reader, as well as make the paper more understandable. 
1.5.1 Joint Audit 
As stated in Ratzinger-Sakel, Audousset-Coulier, Kettunen and Lesage’s (2012) overview of 
existing research on joint audit: 
 
Joint audit can be defined as an audit in which financial statements are audited by two 
independent auditors with: 
● Shared audit effort; 
● One single auditor’s report signed by both auditors; and 
● Joint liability for both auditors 
 
1.5.2 Big 4 
Big 4 is a concept that is frequently used in the industry of auditing. The concept refers to the 
four biggest participants in the worldwide auditing market. Previous research has shown that 
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accounting quality should elevate if a Big 4 firm is hired (Francis et al., 2009). The four largest 
firms are: 
 
● PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
● EY  
● KPMG 
● Deloitte  
1.5.3 Accounting Quality 
Higher accounting quality is, in this study, defined as smaller or none earnings manipulation in 
the reported earnings which we deem more relevant for different users of accounting. 
Accounting quality is hence a result of proxies derived from reported earnings, SPOS and net 
income scaled by total assets. Henceforward, we address accounting quality with the 
abbreviation AQ.  
1.5.4 SPOS 
SPOS is an abbreviation for small profit earnings and is the firm’s aim to avoid negative results. 
The proxy SPOS is a way to identify earnings manipulation, it measures the net income scaled 
by total assets.  
1.6 Outline 
Onwards, the paper proceeds by presenting a literature review of previous studies and findings 
on the topic joint audit and accounting quality in chapter two. In the same chapter we present our 
hypotheses. In chapter three, our method and equations are introduced. Thereafter follows our 
results and analysis of these results in chapters four and five. Finally, our conclusions are 
revealed in chapter six. 
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, previous studies in the field of accounting quality and joint audit are presented in an 
extensive review. Firstly, the accounting quality (AQ) is presented together with the chosen proxies. 
Afterwards, joint audit is presented along with its positive and negative effects. The chapter finalizes in a 
summary of the literature in a comprehensive section. 
2.1 Accounting Quality 
In the process of determining the definition of AQ, it is essential to put forward arguments for 
which proxies to use. Marton (2013) argues that the most central measure is the reported 
earnings. With this in mind, many studies use different measures of earnings quality as a proxy 
for AQ (Barth et al., 2008; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2013; Lang, Raedy and Yetman, 2003; Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). However, to identify the earnings quality, there is a need to use 
proxies as well. Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) organize proxies for earnings quality in three 
main categories: properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings, and external 
indicators of earnings misstatements. Where Barth et al. (2008) among others focus mainly on 
the properties of earnings which can be explained through the shift from the prudence concept 
conservatism and the matching principle towards the new principle of relevance (Marton, 2013). 
The principle of relevance identifies a higher AQ when the reported earnings are of great 
usefulness for decisions for different users. In the meantime, the quality of accounting can 
depend greatly on its purpose, different users have interests in different parts of the accounting 
(Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
The investor responsiveness to earnings take a starting point in the stock market which is a good 
indicator since the investor is viewed as the most important user; however, these measures are 
influenced by many other aspects, creating a noise for the direct effect from the accounting. On 
the other hand, insufficient measures of the extent of effects on AQ can degrade the usefulness 
of external indicators of earnings misstatements. This further contribute with expertise on what 
can be viewed as relevant or not (Marton, 2013; Dechow et al., 2010). The advantage of 
proceeding from the properties of earnings is the neutral stand that views solely the numbers 
presented in the financial reports. It is directed to any kind of user which may better describe the 
extent of research in the field of AQ (Barth et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2003; et cetera).  
 
Many of the studies in the field of joint audit examine the effects joint audit has on audit quality. 
However, the proxies used in those studies are the same or similar as for those used to measure 
earnings quality (Francis et al., 2009; Barth et al., 2008). Hence, the conclusion is that the 
attempt to measure the quality of accounting can take many forms and there is no actual 
definition of what it really means. We return to the arguments of Marton (2013) and define AQ as 
a result from the proxies from the reported earnings, the earnings quality. In the following 
sections, we describe the proxies used in this study, in line with Barth et al. (2008), Lang et al. 
(2003), Ahmed et al. (2013), and Leuz et al. (2003). Income smoothing is presented as the 
change in net income divided by total assets of the firm, and SPOS is the occurrence of small 
positive earnings. Hereafter, Income smoothing and SPOS are described.  
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2.1.1 Income Smoothing 
One element with repeated appearance in the literature for any kind of AQ, whether referring to 
audit quality, earnings quality or any of the many definitions, is the phenomenon of income or 
earnings smoothing (Ahmed, et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2003; Leuz, et al., 2003; 
Lang, Raedy and Wilson, 2006). Income smoothing is an important part of the accrual-based 
accounting used around the world. The outcome of the use of accruals may result in smoothed 
earnings which better suits the goal of the firm, because in the accrual-based system it is up to 
judgements from the managers to decide which period revenues or expenses belong to. Ahmed, 
et al. (2013) base their study of income smoothing on comparing the variability of net income to 
the variability of cash flow to identify if managers use accruals to smooth changes in cash flow 
when reporting net income. They suggest that the variance of net income should be less than the 
variance of cash flow. Since the standard setters have established this framework rather than a 
cash-based system, the income smoothing is inevitable; however, it is of interest to proclaim 
whether it is an artificial smoothness or simply developed through fundamental performance 
(Dechow et al., 2010). This is not within the scope of this study, yet it is of essential knowledge to 
the limits of the study of the proxy, and the use of similar proxies. Additionally, as suggested in 
Lang et al. (2003) the evidence provided is circumstantial because of the difficulties in 
disentangling accounting differences from underlying economics. This leads to the conclusion 
that income smoothing is an interesting aspect to this study because it appears to be a common 
corporate practice (Dechow et al., 2010). Yet it is difficult to clearly disentangle the economic 
background to the employment. 
 
In accordance with the purpose of our study, it is important to identify reliable measures for AQ 
per se. As mentioned in section 2.1. Accounting Quality, the category properties of earnings 
presents a valuable neutral stand to the AQ (Dechow et al., 2010). The proxy income smoothing 
is one way to appoint the AQ with moderate reliability, where focus of the measure lays on the 
variability of earnings. Smoothed earnings would implicate earnings management in the financial 
statements and result in a lower degree of AQ. The AQ depends however partially on the target 
user. The stock market is interested in a steady level of earnings in order to increase the degree 
of usefulness for investment decisions. Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that more persistent and 
less volatile earnings yield better results in equity valuation models, thus the management has 
incentives to manipulate their earnings to adapt to the perceived needs from the stock market. 
Dechow et al. (2010) accentuate that there are many proxies that use the same properties of 
earnings even though the measures are contradictory, they will not necessarily be wrong. 
However, to maintain the neutral stand on AQ, this study will stick to the approach used in Lang 
et al. (2003), Leuz et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2008) that contravenes the earnings persistence 
idea. In the above mentioned studies, income smoothing is used to indicate the degree of AQ. 
Either the earnings are more volatile and have a higher variance, as an indication of no 
smoothing and a higher degree, or the opposite, less volatile and a lower variance indicating a 
lower degree of AQ.  
 
Furthermore, there is a use of several measures for the income smoothing in order to assure 
consistent results across the different measures and not due to other factors (Leuz et al. 2003; 
Lang et al. 2003). Studies on the subject of income smoothing as a proxy for AQ present mainly three 
different aspects of income or earnings smoothing. Firstly, the variability of the change in net income 
scaled by total assets, ∆NI/A. Secondly, (as mentioned above,) the variability of the change in net income 
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scaled by the variability of the change in operating cash flows: ∆NI/∆CF. As with the nature of income 
smoothing, more smoothed earnings, exposed to earnings management, would be less volatile. The 
desirable result for the highest AQ would be that these first measures were more volatile. Ultimately, 
concerning the Spearman correlation between accruals and cash flows, Myers, Myers, Skinner, Gu and 
Jain (2007), and Land and Lang (2002) argue that the correlation between accruals and cash flow matters. 
They assert that a negative correlation indicates that managers respond to poor cash flow by increasing the 
accruals, and according to yet another study, a negative correlation would also be expected between 
accruals and cash flow since accounting accruals reverse over time (Barth et al., 2008). 
2.1.2 SPOS 
The ambition for a firm to not show a negative net income might lead onto earnings 
management in the process of accounting. And this process will possibly deliberately affect the 
earnings to reach just above zero. From this logic, a higher number of firms than statistically 
expected have earnings just above zero than otherwise would be expected. Burgstahler and 
Dichew (1997) examine the phenomenon of avoiding negative earnings through earnings 
management and find the exertion of this in 30 to 44 percent of the firms with slightly negative 
pre-managed earnings. In the study, a histogram is presented with earnings scaled by the initial 
market value (see Appendix Figure 1). The distribution is single-peaked and bell-shaped, except 
in the region near zero, where earnings slightly above zero are identified to a higher degree of 
frequency than the earnings slightly below, to a higher degree of occurrence than expected. 
Firms are motivated to avoid negative results to keep transaction costs with stakeholders as low 
as possible. Through manipulation of cash flows from operations and changes in working capital, 
the firm can avoid negative earnings and maintain a good reputation. This would even, for the 
interest of the present study, implicate lower AQ.  
 
Another reason why a Swedish firm would choose to manage the earnings towards a SPOS is 
the Swedish context of tax-driven accounting (Påhlsson, 2014). The tax burden is directly related 
to the net income, leading to an incentive for managers to manipulate the earnings for a lower 
tax burden. Since SPOS is derived from net income, and tax burden is included in net income, it 
is an adequate measure for the impact that the manager has on AQ. Other possible incentives 
behind the employment of this kind of earnings management is referred to the obtained improved 
terms regarding agreements from suppliers or lenders due to the higher profitability. Customers 
are willing to pay a higher price if the firm is assumed to be on better terms economically, and 
employees are more likely to stay (Burgstahler and Dichew, 1997).  
 
Dechow et al. (2010) is more critical to this proxy for accounting and earnings quality where they 
present the SPOS as a common, but controversial interpretation of earnings management. This 
means that studies have drawn the conclusion that the occurrence of SPOS indicates lower AQ. 
However, Dechow et al. (2010) states that there are other reasons for the small profits, such as 
discretionary accruals that are not differentiated between small profit and small loss firms 
(Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Or according to Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) 
that SPOS is explained by tax asymmetries, rather than opportunistic choice.  
 
Despite some critical viewpoints, the SPOS is used in several papers to assess AQ. Barth et al. 
(2008) examines the measure as an indicator of earnings management. The small positive 
earnings are measured through a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if net income from one 
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year, scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01. The firms where this measure is not 
identified are subsequently those with higher AQ. Similarly, Lang et al. (2003) and Bisogno and 
De Luca, (2016) utilize the same measure as one of their proxies. Barth et al. (2008) and Lang 
et al. (2003), use several control variables to minimize underlying economic differences from 
accounting differences. However, as presented in Lang et al. (2003), the results are generally 
unchanged without the control variables which are why the model of Bisogno and De Luca, 
(2016) is valuable to this current study. In addition, their equation for SPOS includes fewer 
control variables and those are used consequently in the equation, which raises the 
understanding with the simplicity of the variables (Bisogno and De Luca, 2016). Apart from fewer 
control variables, Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) also measure SPOS as the dependent variable. 
This is consistent with our proposed methodology in chapter 3.  
  
Leuz et al. (2003) also measure the occurrence of small profits, but with a different approach. In 
their paper they investigate the small loss avoidance by examining the ratio of small profits to 
small losses. The results present the extent of earnings management to avoid reporting losses. 
Likewise, small profits are calculated as earnings scaled by total assets that falls in the range of 
0 to 0.01, on the contrary small losses are defined as the same ratio but in the range of -0.01 to 
0. 
 
2.2 Joint Audit 
In the literature of joint audit, both advantages and disadvantages are presented. The support for 
mandatory or voluntary joint audit argues the provision of increased confidence for the auditor 
due to the fact that debatable issues need agreements from both parties before being signed 
(Mazars, 2010). Along this line, the failure from both auditors ought to occur on a rarely basis, 
signaling an increased audit quality (Bisogno and De Luca, 2016). Another benefit is the 
assurance of auditor rotation, which maintains the impartiality necessary for high quality auditing, 
while still enabling preservation of knowledge and expertise of the audit (Mazars, 2010; Carcello 
and Nagy, 2004). The adoption of joint audit also expands the audit market and stimulates the 
market competition, the Big 4 would no longer dominate the market and hence give non-Big 4 
firms an opportunity to growin accordance with the market competition (Andrè et al., 2009; 
Mazars, 2010). However, this may also imply a decrease in audit quality.  As suggested by 
Francis et al. (2009), the involvement of a Big 4 or even a pair of Big 4 increases the audit 
quality, and the lack of an involved Big 4 firm in the audit process, exposes the firm to a lower 
degree of audit quality. What Mazars (2010) views as beneficial in this situation, is the greater 
entrance of the market of non-Big 4 firms, leading them to learn and increase their competence 
to supply the market with a wider spectrum of choices of qualified auditors.  
 
The last enumerated benefit of joint audit presented in this study is the better resistance of 
managerial pressure. The need for auditors to produce an independent audit, not affected by 
managers of the firm, is a risk for the system of auditing. A joint audit should lead to better 
abilities to stand up to bribes or other pressure from managers since they are mutually 
responsible for the audit and it will force the managers to engage in informal negotiations to a 
greater extent in order to obtain their desired results (Zerni et al., 2012). Studies suggest an 
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augmented independence for auditors in a joint audit, which is important in the aspect of its 
quality (Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Zerni et al., 2012). 
 
Besides the beneficial effects of joint audit, other studies have found discouraging results of joint 
audit. Arguments contesting the joint audit feature the risk for free-rider problems. Neveling 
(2007) describes this as the risk for an auditor neglecting his or her responsibility and instead 
rely on the other auditor for doing all the work. This along with the conclusion from Francis et al. 
(2009) would indicate that a pair of two Big 4 firms and a pair of one Big 4 firm and one non-Big 
4 firm are in higher risk for free rider problems and decreases the accounting quality. Moreover, 
the audit firms are entangled in a controversy obliged to cooperate in the collaboration process 
of joint audit despite their shared competitive position. In other words, a cooperation which 
inevitably would lead to lower quality of auditing. The need for exchanging information may be 
disregarded according to Neveling (2007) having yet another negative impact on joint audit. 
Finally, Neveling (2007) brings up the shortcomings of accounting standards per se, which are 
open for different interpretations. Accordingly, this might cause conflicts and reduced 
cooperation between the auditors. 
2.3  Joint Audit and Accounting Quality 
In this section of the Literature Review, the effects of joint audit on AQ are presented. The 
section first introduces studies showing a positive effect from employing joint audit. Secondly, 
studies arguing for the non-existent or negative effects on AQ of joint audit are presented. 
2.3.1 Positive Effects of Joint Audit on Accounting Quality 
Considering the scarcity of joint audit regulation in the world, a lower variety of studies has 
researched the subject. There is a belief that “two heads are better than one” and would 
accordingly, in this case, mean that having two separate audit firms performing audit, the 
financial reports would lead to a higher level of AQ (Francis et al., 2009). Additionally, Francis et 
al. (2009) have reached the conclusion that two auditors are better than one through identifying a 
significant correlation between abnormal accruals and audit fees with a high earnings quality. 
The study investigates firms from France that mandatorily employ joint audit, causing a non-
direct link to our study. The contribution to the impact of joint audit is at the same time greater 
with this material. Being forced to adapt to joint audit makes the sample used in Francis et al. 
(2009) more comparable to other research, not taking into consideration what kind of firms 
choose to adopt joint audit. This could implicate limitations in our study, where joint audit is 
voluntarily applied, but the Swedish and French firms are at least attributed to a similar 
ownership concentration with mainly few, larger shareholders (Francis et al., 2009; Agnblad, 
Berglöf, Högfeldt and Svancar, 2001).  Other findings in the study of Francis et al. (2009) 
suggest that even though the earnings quality are perceived to comprise higher quality, it does 
not affect the valuation on the stock market, creating a doubt in whether joint audit produces 
higher quality audits than those of single-audit- kind. However, the study finds that the French 
firms are valued higher than the Belgian single-audit which would indicate that the market still 
values the incidence of joint audit.   
 
Other studies confirming the positive effects on AQ from employing joint audit are Bisogno and 
De Luca, (2016), El Assy (2015), and Zerni et al. (2012). The outcome of the first-mentioned 
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study presents a strong, positive relationship between joint audit and the proxy used for earnings 
quality: SPOS (Bisogno and De Luca, 2016). In their findings, the presented results are that the 
mere presence of joint audit increases the quality of accounting, reduces earnings management, 
and can better confront the influence from the strong influential owners in the Italian SMEs' 
(small and medium sized enterprises) highly concentrated ownership. The control for earnings 
quality is on the other hand tested on one mere proxy unlike other studies (Barth et al., 2008; 
Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). The results presented are still of use in this study due to the 
similar context of samples from only one country and firms with highly concentrated ownership. 
Additionally, in the study of El Assy (2015) the findings suggest a connection between joint audit 
and increased earnings conservatism, as a proxy for audit quality. El Assy (2015) finds no 
significant difference between firms audited by joint auditors voluntarily or mandatorily. Zerni et 
al. (2012) examine the relationship between joint audit and audit quality in the similar setting as 
our current study. Similarly to El Assy (2015), the proxy utilized is earnings conservatism, which 
once again is suggested to increase the quality of auditing. Additional findings include lower 
abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and lower perceived risk of becoming insolvent within the 
next year than other firms with the reservation of limitations in the empirical approach of a 
matching procedure. The control variables used in the study might not have been sufficient to 
fend for uncontrolled disparity in client characteristics rather than the characteristics of auditors.  
2.3.2 Negative Effects of Joint Audit on Accounting Quality 
Nevertheless, existing research in this field is not unified. While Francis et al. (2009) and 
Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) among others find a positive correlation between joint audit and 
AQ, other studies suggest the opposite. As many other studies, Lesage, Ratzinger-Sakel and 
Kettunen (2012) research the subject of AQ on joint audit as a part of a greater whole. In their 
findings from Danish firms, where mandatory joint audits were abolished just before the study, 
they could not identify a higher audit quality associated with joint audit. Similar caveats appear in 
this study as abovementioned. The research is implemented in one single country and it is 
difficult to draw conclusions for the whole market on that aspect alone. Concurrently, only one 
proxy for audit quality is measured despite pointing out the fact of the hardship of observing audit 
quality.  
 
In the study of Deng et al. (2014), the benefits and perceived higher quality as a consequence of 
joint audit is challenged. They argue that the audit will not be of higher quality in a joint audit 
collaboration consisting of one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 audit firm compared to a single audit 
performed by one Big 4 firm alone, due to free riding problems arising. Furthermore, they argue 
for the fact that a joint audit actually is presented to a higher risk of being affected by opinion 
shopping. Opinion shopping is a practice used by firms to find an auditor willing to make 
unqualified opinions and therefore find the financial report to be fairly presented, when they as a 
matter of fact are not. According to Deng et al. (2014), joint audit gives the firm an opportunity to 
seek this unqualified opinion between the two audit firms, and thus impair the auditor 
independence. The conclusion of that study is that a single audit performed by one Big 4 firm is 
equivalent or even better than any set of pair of joint audit. 
 
Velte and Azibi (2015) do not find a significant positive effect on audit quality for joint audit firms. 
In their study, they investigate the effects of abnormal working capital, abnormal accruals, and 
audit fees. Referring to DeAngelo (1981), there is a risk that joint audit is in the presence of 
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lowballing, meaning that the initial mandate for audit fees does not cover the actual costs. This 
will in turn expose the audit for asymmetrical distribution of information and lead to higher 
incentive for coalition with the management and thus have a negative impact on auditor 
independence (Velte and Azibi, 2015). The joint audit is, as previously stated, said to lead to a 
lower market concentration. Velte and Azibi (2015) however, argue that the nonexistent positive 
effect of joint audit lead to the market choosing not to implement mandatory joint audit and thus 
will not resolve the high market concentration that exists in the industry of audit. 
 
Finally, Marmousez (2008) examines the connection between joint audit and earnings 
conservatism. The study finds that the joint audit of two Big 4 firms does not lead to more 
conservatism. This result is argued to be caused by a less productive interaction between the 
firms. The incentive to provide the maximum effort is reduced due to the fact that they are likely 
to rely on each other compared to the joint audit pair of a one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 firm.  
2.4 Summary of Literature 
The following section is established to sum up the literature presented in this chapter. Firstly, the 
literature of accounting quality was reviewed, dominated by the effects of the accrual based 
accounting. The accrual based accounting enables the managers to decide as to which period 
the value should be actualized. Proxies used to identify these earnings management 
opportunities differ across studies but some appear more frequently. Barth et al. (2008), Lang et 
al. (2003), Ahmed et al. (2013), and Leuz et al. (2003) use proxies for income smoothing and the 
occurrence of small profits called SPOS. A less volatile result indicates a smoothed earning and 
is hence equal to lower AQ. SPOS is the managerial earnings manipulation to avoid negative 
earnings. Burgstahler and Dichew (1997) find that more earnings scaled by total assets fall in the 
ratio of 0 to 0.01 than would be statistically possible. Therefore, earnings scaled by total assets 
between 0 and 0.01 are an indication of managed earnings and hence lower AQ. Finally, Lang et 
al. (2003) argues that the use of proxies has several defects, by the nature of accounting it is 
hard to capture the reality and it is therefore difficult to disentangle the economic background for 
the accounting results behind the used proxies. 
 
Secondly, the benefits of joint audits were presented. According to Mazars (2010), joint audit 
would contribute to fewer mistakes when both auditors need to sign the financial statements, and 
also a retained audit rotation as to not become too entangled with the firm. Further positive 
effects of joint audit were presented as decreased market concentration (Andrè et al., 2009) and 
less managerial pressure on the auditors (Zerni et al., 2012). However, the literature also 
presented disadvantages of joint audit, such as free rider problem (Nevelling, 2007) and a lower 
willingness to collaborate between competitive audit firms (Francis et al., 2009). 
 
Subsequently, we presented the previous studies in the field of joint audit and their connection to 
AQ. While Francis et al. (2009), Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) and El Assy (2015) have found 
positive effects on the quality through the use of different proxies, other studies found a negative 
or no effect of joint audit (Lesage et al., 2012; Deng et al., 2014; Marmousez, 2008). Deng et al. 
(2014) discussed the free rider problem and found an increased risk for jointly audited firms to be 
affected by this, and Marmousez (2008) found that auditors had impediments relying on each 
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other and not spending an equal amount of effort on a joint audit. Whereas these studies 
examined the joint audit, several have measured joint audit against audit quality.  
 
The literature review is the basis for the hypotheses of the study, which are presented in the next 
section. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
In accordance with the purpose of the study to find out how accounting quality is linked to joint 
audit and with the aid of the literature review we formulate the following null hypotheses. Since 
the AQ in this study is measured through two proxies, we also express these two different null 
hypotheses in order to be able to assess them separately in the analysis. Through the literature 
review we have reached the inference to state the hypotheses in this manner, with a neutral 
viewpoint of interrelations between AQ and joint audit. Both hypotheses are formulated for two-
tailed tests indicating that the AQ can be positively or negatively influenced by joint audit. In the 
next chapter, our methodology used to perform this study is introduced and includes the 
equations used to test the hypothesis along with other procedures throughout this study. 
 
 
𝑯𝟏𝟎: 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑛-𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
 
 
𝑯𝟐𝟎: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆 
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3 Method 
This chapter presents the method used to investigate the research question. Firstly, the process of sample 
elaboration is presented, followed by data collection. Additionally, the method for the tests of accounting 
quality is described and the reverse causality issue. Lastly, the reliability and validity of this paper are 
presented. 
 
To accomplish the aim of this study, a quantitative study is determined to be best suited. The 
study is subjected to firms in Sweden where single audit and joint audit are applied. Identification 
of firms using joint audit is constructed by accessing the list of the top 500 Swedish firms by 
revenue, the list available in the database Retriever Business. The same database is further 
utilized to identify basic information required for calculations of AQ. AQ and design of our 
equations for measuring AQ are put together with inspiration from previously carried out reports 
on the topic. Furthermore, a logistic regression model is applied in order to depict interrelations 
between the selected variables of our measurement. Our use of dummy variables obliges us to 
use this model when measuring for SPOS. 
 
For our statistical tests, a level of significance of 5 percent is chosen. This is a generally 
accepted level in the research field of business and management (Collis and Hussey, 2013). As 
well as Bryman and Bell (2013) state that 5 percent is the highest risk accepted in studies of 
social science. 
3.1 Sample 
Our aim in this study is to measure AQ and the link to joint audit among Swedish firms, and for 
this, we need a carefully elaborated sample. In fact, we use this sample in two different ways, 
one for testing income smoothing and one for SPOS. In the selection of sample, certain criteria 
are considered. Firstly, large Swedish firms is the top requirement, hence their accounting 
information is compiled in the database Retriever. Secondly, the probability of finding a large 
enough sample for obtaining a statistically significant sample of firms applying joint audit is 
through that same list. Moreover, since the identified number of firms using joint audit is limited; 
our requirements for elaborating a sample are not very radical. Due to the scarcity of firms 
applying joint audit, we are furthermore aware of the risk that our findings are exposed to 
possible disinformation when comparing accounting quality, among our samples. The possibility 
of choosing samples based on industry affiliation is nonexistent.  
3.2 Data Collection 
Secondary data is collected for this sample analysis (Cortinhas and Black, 2012). Accounting 
control variables are extracted from the database Retriever Business. To elaborate our exact 
sample, firms from a list of the top 500 largest firms in Sweden are gathered. However, a rough 
screening is put forward to eliminate firms with missing lines of financial information 
characteristics that are necessary for extracting accounting variables. This screening is useful 
since it would be too costly in terms of time to elevate these data. A sorting is put through to 
keep only firms within the same size range that of the sample of joint audits. The elimination is 
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vital to prevent difficulties referred to calculations and to avoid disinformation. This elimination 
leaves us 400 samples for our statistical tests. This exact sample is used to test for SPOS and 
income smoothing. In order to test income smoothing, it has been essential to identify the 
number of joint audit firms. Among the above mentioned 400 firms, 32 firms are identified 
employing joint audit. Hence, as for income smoothing, the sample is divided into two groups, 
joint audit and non-joint audit. Sample data is jointly collected on the year of 2014, and when 
change is required, data from years 2013 and 2014 are collected.  
 
Sampling error is possibly occurring since our sample of both joint audits and non-joint audits 
are selected from a list of large firms. This does not take into consideration which industry our 
sample firms belong to. Nor is it all representative of the total number of firms registered in 
Sweden. In fact, the average Swedish firm is small or medium sized (SCB, 2015; Bolagsverket, 
2012). Therefore, this error could affect the reliability of results of accounting quality due to unfair 
comparison of the AQ across industries (Nilsson, Isaksson and Martikainen, 2002).  
3.3 Accounting Quality 
To measure accounting quality, we have chosen to divide AQ into two sub areas. These 
represent two proxies for earnings quality which is then translated directly to AQ. Overall, we 
expect that higher quality earnings are a result of less earnings management (Barth et al., 2008).  
3.3.1 Income Smoothing  
In situations where accounting choices have resulted in greater income smoothing, a wider 
extent of earnings management as compromising faithful representation of the underlying 
economics is identified and hence reducing AQ (Barth et al., 2008). These findings are 
consistent with prior accounting studies.  
 
According to Ahmed et al. (2013), there is no generally agreed-upon definition of AQ. But there 
are some measures of AQ that are related to faithful representation of the underlying economics 
which is to a wider extension accepted by standard setters, regulators, practitioners and users as 
well as by academics. We make the assumption that if Ahmed et al. (2013) can find these 
measures suitable for their study, then so can we. One of them is income smoothing. In 
accordance with prior research, the assumption is that firms with less earnings smoothing show 
a higher level of earnings variability (Lang et al., 2006).  
 
The proxy income smoothing is addressed firstly. Income smoothing is for example a result of the usage 
of accruals to manage earnings. As Barth et al. (2008) have used the same equations in their study; we aim 
to use a similar but adapted equation (1) with factors of higher relevance for our selected sample. We want 
to use the following equation for deriving the ratio of variability of the change in net income (∆NI) to the 
total assets (A), ∆NI/A.  
 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟
∆𝑁𝐼
𝐴
(𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇) ≠ 𝑉𝑎𝑟
∆𝑁𝐼
𝐴
(𝑁𝑂𝑁) 
           (Equation 1) 
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Where: 
- ∆NI is the change in net income 
- A is the total assets 
- 𝑉𝑎𝑟
∆𝑁𝐼
𝐴
(𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇) is the variance for joint audit firms 
 
- 𝑉𝑎𝑟
∆𝑁𝐼
𝐴
(𝑁𝑂𝑁) is the variance for non-joint audit firms 
 
We perform a variance ratio test to analyze the difference in variance of net income scaled by total assets. 
This test compares the group of joint audit firms to the group of non-joint audit firms. Our predictions are 
that firms with higher quality earnings are subject of less earnings management. For ∆NI/A, less volatile 
earnings indicate lower quality (Ahmed et al., 2013). Less volatile earnings would indicate a probability 
that a manager actively tries to adjust earnings to some kind of predetermined firm goal. The volatility of 
net income is developed from the standard deviation of the ∆NI/A and then squared to find the variance. 
Later, to determine which group has the highest degree of AQ the results from ∆NI/A-JOINT (for the 
variance of joint audit firms) are compared with ∆NI/A-NON (for the variance of non-joint audit firms).  
3.3.2 SPOS 
One of the tests we perform in order to identify the degree of AQ is identifying small positive 
earnings, called SPOS, and implementing it as a proxy for AQ. As presented in chapter 2 
Literature Review, this technique is commonly used in this field of research (Barth et al., 2008; 
Burgstahler and Dichew, 1997). The idea of SPOS is that earnings falling just short of zero will 
be managed upwards, while earnings far from threshold reserved for the future to make the 
thresholds more attainable (Degeorge, 1999). By identifying small positive earnings, one might 
conclude that the earnings have been managed and therefore decreasing the AQ. The reason 
for firms to participate in this matter would appear to be the preference from management to 
rather report a small positive earning instead of a negative result (Barth et al., 2008).  
 
In order to identify the existence of SPOS we refer to Leuz et al. (2003), Barth et al. (2008) and 
Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) and calculate the ratio of net income scaled by total assets and 
code this dichotomous variable SPOS as 1 if the ratio is within the range of [0.00, 0.01] and 0 if 
not. SPOS is accordingly treated as a binomial variable and hence we have utilized the logistic 
regression model to test AQ for the SPOS proxy in the following equation (2): 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆(1,0) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐽𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇(1,0) + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐷/𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷(1,0)
+ 𝛽62𝐵𝐼𝐺4(1,0) + 𝜀 
            (Equation 2) 
 
Where:  
- SPOS (1,0) is the dependent variable in the equation. It is the proxy for AQ, coded 1 in 
the presence of SPOS, which indicates low AQ and 0 otherwise. 
- JOINT (1,0) is an indicator variable set to 1 for firms with joint audit and 0 otherwise. For 
joint audit to have a higher quality than non-joint audit firms, the expected sign is “−”. 
The negative sign implicates a less inclination to engage in earnings manipulation 
towards SPOS. 
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- SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the value of total assets. A larger firm ought to 
be more inclined to indulge in earnings manipulation, being more in need of obtaining 
financial resources from external subjects (Cameran and Prencipe, 2011). The purpose 
of SPOS is to avoid the bad publicity of having negative results; publicly listed firms 
would therefore have larger incentives to surrender to SPOS earnings management.  As 
such smaller firms being less scrutinized and having less pressure from the external 
parties to match certain goals are less willing to upward manage their earnings to avoid a 
negative result, which, in the Swedish case, only would lead to a higher tax burden for 
them. Conclusively the expected sign is “+” due to the larger firm’s higher incentives 
(Bisogno and De Luca, 2016). 
- D/E is used as a control variable and is represented by the financial leverage of the firm 
measured as the ratio of total debt scaled by shareholders’ equity. Previous studies 
argue that a higher degree of leverage is associated with violation of debt covenants 
(Press and Weintrop, 1990). Additionally, a firm with high levels of debts has higher 
incentives to engage in earnings management compared to other firms. In order for them 
to avoid reporting negative results (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam, 
1998). The conclusion of this evidence is that a higher leveraged firm is more willing to 
use the earnings manipulation in form of SPOS and therefore we expect a sign of “+”. 
- GROWTH in sales is used instead of price to book value, due to the limitations of our 
sample, where not every firm is listed. The calculation for the growth in sales is the 
percentage of change in sales in the previous year. With arguments in accordance with 
Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) this variable is included due to the higher likelihood of 
earnings management in firms with strong growth projections. Although the findings from 
Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) contradict their own expectations, the expected sign for 
this variable is “+”. 
- LISTED (1,0) is used to control for differing AQ that is due to the usage of different 
accounting regulations. Firms listed on the stock market are obliged to present their 
financial reports in accordance with IFRS which is of higher quality accounting (Ahmed et 
al., 2013) than Swedish national regulations, K3. This dummy variable is assigned 1 in 
the presence of a listed firm, hence using IFRS, and 0 otherwise. The expected sign is 
“−” for this variable, indicating that a listed firm is less inclined to produce a manipulated 
financial reports. 
- 2BIG4 (1,0) is used to control for a possibly higher AQ based on which firms perform the 
audit. Most of the sample group employing joint audit used at least one Big 4 firm, 
therefore this dichotomous variable is noted 1 when both auditors are Big 4 firms and 0 
when only one or none of the auditors were Big 4. The Big 4 are expected to contribute 
with higher AQ than non-Big 4 firms, thus the expected sign is “−”. 
 
Additionally, a correlation matrix will be presented of the variables used in the model. Especially 
testing the multicollinearity as to reduce the risk of erratic changes in the coefficient estimates 
due to small changes in the model. A multiple regression like the one used for SPOS is 
vulnerable to multicollinearity. To test this, a correlation matrix will be presented. This refers to 
Niemi’s (2005) statement that values exceeding 0.8 in the correlation coefficient are an 
indication for interpreting significant multicollinearity problems.  
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3.4 Reverse Causality Issue 
In the endeavor of comparing data from the reality, the researcher often finds oneself in a 
situation where it is difficult to identify the causality one variable has on another. Two problems 
arise, where the first is the issue of an omitted variable. This situation emerges when the results 
suggest that one variable causes another variable when it in fact is a third, omitted variable, 
unknown in the original result. Even though there is no omitted variable, another issue may arise 
making it difficult to draw conclusions about cause and effect. This problem is due to reverse 
causation, implying that A causes B, when in fact B causes A (Mankiw, 2011). Or in the case of 
this study, whether joint audit causes better or worse AQ, or AQ causes the need for joint audit. 
The AQ is, as established, a difficult phenomenon to measure and thus many variables could 
affect the quality of accounting.  
 
The reverse causality issue presents the mistake of wrongly inferring the direction of the cause. 
Considering the example presented in Mankiw (2011) where a plot of number of violent crimes 
per thousand people in major cities against the number of police officers per thousand people 
(see Appendix Figure 2.). The upward slope might lead one to conclude that an increased 
number of police officers causes crime, when in fact major cities employ more officers in an 
attempt to reduce crime. Reverse causality issue explains that a graph or a correlation do not 
necessarily present a direction of causality. As well as police causing crime, it also could mean 
that crime causes the size of the police force. Mankiw (2011) describes that the easiest way to 
determine the course of causality is the examination of which variable moves first. If we see an 
increase in crimes and then the expansion of the police force, one conclusion is reached. On the 
other hand, if we see the police forces expand and then an increase in crimes, another 
conclusion is reached. There is, however, a flaw with this approach according to Mankiw (2011), 
the change in behavior could be governed by expectations. A city expecting an increase in 
crimes could hire more police officers now to mitigate this anticipation in the future.  
 
A further reason for not drawing precipitated conclusions about cause is the risk for the 
correlation to be coincidental. Two variables could in fact be entirely unrelated, but have reached 
a correlation by chance, due to the chosen confidence interval. A 95 percent confidence level 
will present a 5 percent risk for the variables to correlate by chance. The important contributions 
of Mankiw (2011) are to keep in mind these flaws when handling with causations. 
3.5 Reliability and Validity 
Addressing the subject of validity, AQ can be measured in various ways. A wide variety of 
research exists in the field and different conclusions have been drawn on which proxies reflect 
the most adequate AQ, reflected in the literature review. We argue that our chosen proxies result 
in a fair measure of AQ, though not complete. Moreover, concerning the validity, we cannot 
assure that our proxies, with a hundred percent certainty, is the source of influence on AQ by 
joint audit, aligned with the reverse causality issue. Nevertheless, we add control variables to our 
equations in order to control for a higher degree of certainty for these unexpected or random 
conditions. Although application of control variables, there are undoubtedly a number of external 
conditions that we cannot control for or predict. The AQ can be a result of change in accounting 
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policies, external effects such as differences in market price but constant currency or price of 
costs, investments et cetera.  
 
Additionally, both our proxies are derived from measure of net income, resulting in a not so 
varying test. This study however assumes AQ as a result of the firm’s earnings quality, and net 
income is the essential of that measure. Nonetheless, to create more reliability a consideration 
for using other proxies has been debated, but determined outside the scope of this study. 
 
In accordance with Bryman and Bell (2013), applying higher reliability, (in a quantitative study, it 
is important to discuss whether the measures are stable or random) means that we choose 
financial information accessible from Retriever Database which further is collected from the 
financial statements of the firms. This financial information is closely chosen on a basis on 
equations similar to previous successful research. We use those equations, though with a 
smaller adjustment which means that they are reliable and will display a fair outcome.  
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4 Results 
The fourth chapter includes the empirical results reached from the methodology used in the study. Firstly, 
the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model together with a correlation matrix are presented. 
Secondly, we present our findings of the proxy income smoothing. The chapter ends with presenting the 
results from the logistic regression model used to find the results for SPOS. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our models. Firstly, 32 firms 
of our sample employ joint audit, resulting in 8.00 percent. Of those, 84.38 percent consists of 
two Big 4 firms, with a total of 27 equal to 6.75 percent in the whole sample of 400 observations. 
Secondly, SPOS is identified in 10.00 percent of the whole sample, and 21.86 percent of all joint 
audit firms have a net income scaled by total assets in the range of 0 to 0.01. Finally, 21.25 
percent of all the studied Swedish firms are publicly listed. Within the sub-sample of joint audit 
firms 15.63 percent are listed. In the tests, there are some outliers identified that accordingly 
makes the results less representative of the correlations.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
    
Descriptive Statistics 
    Continuous Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SIZE    14.97234 1.708257 9.842516 20.02296 
GROWTH    28.24237 468.3188 -.9999827 9479 
D/E    5.336585 27.09492 -14.5181 476.5696 
ΔNI/A      .0951738 2.684763 -19.61048 48.44672 
The sample consists of 400 observations from a list of the largest Swedish firms in 2014. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in revenue. D/E is short for financial leverage: debt to equity and is 
measured as the ratio of total debt scaled by shareholders' equity. ΔNI/A is the ratio of the variability of the change in net 
income scaled by total assets. 
Discrete Variables N. %     
SPOS = 1 40 10.00* (21.86**) 
  JOINT = 1 32 8.00 
  LISTED = 1 85 21.25* (15.63**) 
  2BIG4 = 1 27 6.75* (84.38**)   
* Within the whole sample - ** Within the sub-sample of joint audit firms     
SPOS is a proxy for accounting quality, coded 1 in the presence of SPOS, indicating low AQ, and 0 otherwise. JOINT is a 
dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the firm is employing joint audit, 0 otherwise. LIST expresses whether the firm is publicly 
listed with 1 and 0 if it is not. 2BIG4 is expressed in binomial terms, coded 1 if both of the auditors in a joint audit are Big 4 
companies. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
     (obs=400) 
      
         SPOS JOINT SIZE D/E GROWTH LISTED BIG4 
SPOS 1.0000 
      JOINT .01166 1.000 
     SIZE -.0122 -.0107 1.0000 
    D/E .01141 .0483 -.0324 1.0000 
   GROWTH .0063 .1860 .0785 -.0076 1.0000 
  LISTED .0069 .0055 .02922 -.0455 .0999 1.0000 
 2BIG4 .0768 .9127 -.0067 .0574 .1912 .0072 1.0000 
Table 2 shows the correlation between the proxies used in the model for SPOS. 
 
Moderate correlations between the test and its control variables show in the correlation matrix in 
Table 2. The main reason for testing the correlation is to identify multicollinearity, and as 
presented in the literature review is a correlation of 0.8 an indication of multicollinearity. In the 
case of this study multicollinearity is not an issue with correlations well under the 0.8 mark 
(Niemi, 2005). We also notice that 2BIG4 and JOINT indicate a high correlation. This would 
mean that firms applying joint audit most commonly hire the auditors from two Big 4 firms. Both 
variables are however deemed important to keep for further analysis in the next chapter. 
4.2 Income smoothing 
Table 3. Variance Ratio Test 
  
 
  
     
 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev Variance [95% Conf.Interval] 
ΔNI/A-NON 368 .01461 .0080 .1533 .0235 -.0011 .0304 
ΔNI/A-JOINT 32 -.0054 .0171 .0969 .0094 -.0403 .0296 
combined 400 .0130 .0075 .1496 .0224 -.0017 .0277 
     
 
  ratio = sd(ΔNI/A-NON) / sd(ΔNI/A-JOINT)     
 
𝑯𝟎: ratio = 1    
  
 f =2.5046               
df = 366, 31 
     
 
  𝑯𝒂: ratio < 1  
 
       𝑯𝒂: ratio ≠1 
 
 𝑯𝒂: ratio > 1 
Pr(F < f) = 0.9986    2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0029***  Pr(F > f) = 0.0014*** 
     
 
  *** the value is statistically significant to a level of .01  
  Table 3 depicts the results from the variance ratio test of change in net income scaled by total assets. . ΔNI/A is the ratio of the 
variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets. NON stands for firms with non-joint audit. JOINT stands for firms 
with joint audit. 
 
The content of Table 3 depicts our findings from testing the variance of net income scaled by 
total assets. It is a two tailed test that portrays the probability to find out that the sample variance 
of joint audit firms is lower than the sample variance of non-joint audit firms. The Table 3 also 
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presents the mean of the two groups where the ΔNI/A for joint audit firms is negative, -.00538 
and ΔNI/A for non-joint audit firms is positive, .0146.  
The model is significant for the standard deviations of both samples being unequal, where non-
joint audit has a higher variance and is statistically significant to even a .01 level of significance, 
despite our test of .05 level of significance. Reading the same test, the probability of measuring 
a greater variation among non-joint audit firms is higher to a more statistically significant level 
than it would be to find the opposite among joint audit firms. Consequently, the lower standard 
deviation for joint audit firms indicates more frequently occurring income smoothing compared to 
non-joint audit firms. This states that the results are aligned with the predictions, that the 
variance and hence income smoothing is not equal in our two groups, more exactly that the 
variance is higher in the group of non-joint audit firms indicating that they produce a higher 
degree of AQ. 
 
Reading for standard error, it is not a measure that qualifies for our requirements on showing 
reliable results for this test. The standard error is a measure of the dispersion of values in the 
sampling distribution. Hence, the larger number of observations, the lower standard error is 
observed. This could be a legitimate explanation to the evidently higher (twice as high) standard 
error among joint audit firms (depicted in the lower line) compared to non-joint audit firms. 
Therefore, we prefer to base our argumentation on standard deviation. From the standard 
deviation we calculate the variance and its higher value among non-joint audit firms indicate that 
their income is inconsistent to a higher degree than joint audit firms. 
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4.3 SPOS 
Table 4 shows the Coefficients along with various results from the robust logistic regression model, with SPOS as the 
dependent variable. SPOS is a proxy for accounting quality, coded 1 in the presence of SPOS, indicating low AQ, and 0 
otherwise. JOINT is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the firm is employing joint audit, 0 otherwise.  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in revenue. D/E is short for financial leverage: debt to equity 
and is measured as the ratio of total debt scaled by shareholders' equity. LIST expresses whether the firm is publicly listed with 1 
and 0 if it is not. 2BIG4 is expressed in binomial terms, coded 1 if both of the auditors in a joint audit are Big 4 companies. 
 
When testing the logistic regression model for SPOS as dependent variable, the results illustrate 
a statistical significance between SPOS and JOINT (1,0) to a level of significance at .05. The 
odds-ratio in the logistic regression model with SPOS as dependent variable implies that, if the 
odds ratio is greater than 1, having SPOS is considered to be correlated with detecting the 
characteristics of the independent variable (any of SIZE, D/E, GROWTH, LISTED, and 2BIG4) in 
the sense that having the independent variable raises the odds of having SPOS.  
 
The following results are interpreted from our tests presented in Table 4:  
- JOINT (1,0): Calculating for interrelation with SPOS, a firm applying joint audit prove a 
positive correlation (coefficient) that moreover has a significant p-value. The odds ratio 
for JOINT is 6.976 which indicate a strong correlation. A firm that has joint audit is more 
likely to have SPOS in our sample. Since the result has a p-value of .035, we can assure 
that the positive correlation between SPOS and joint audit is statistically significant to a 
.05 level of significance. 
  
- SIZE: The coefficient states that larger firms tend to have a negative correlation with 
SPOS. The odds ratio is .9136 which indicates alongside with the previously mentioned 
definition of odds ratio that SIZE is not positively correlated with SPOS. We interpret this 
as the bigger the firm, the less likely it is to show SPOS. This finding is not statistically 
Table 4. Odds Ratio and Coefficient 
Logistic Regression  
  
 
  
Dependent variable SPOS 
    
 
  
Number of obs = 400 
    
 
  
𝑅2 = 0.034 
Log pseudolikelihood = -125.61667 
    
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
SPOS Exp. sign Odds Ratio Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error z p-value 
 _cons 
 
.3487 -1.0535 2.0257 -.52 .603 
 JOINT - 6.976 1.9424 .9198 2.11 .035 * 
SIZE + .9126 -.0915 .1406 -.65 .515 
 D/E + 1.007 .0066 .0057 1.17 .244 
 GROWTH + .99995 -.0000456 .000177 -.26 .797 
 LISTED - 1.258 .2295 .4777 .48 .631 
 2BIG4 - .318 -1.1458    
 * value is significant to a level of .05 
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significant. Since there is a high p-value of .515 we cannot affirm that the correlation is 
true since we cannot prove it, but on the other hand, we cannot reject the statement 
either, based on the same argument. But the result can still be compared to trends in 
prior research. 
  
- GROWTH: Turning to the results of GROWTH interrelating with SPOS, the higher 
GROWTH the firm depicts, the less likely the firm is to have SPOS. This is perceived by 
the odds ratio .99995 which is just below 1. The relationship, hence coefficient of SPOS 
and GROWTH is hence slightly negative. Unfortunately, this finding is not significant, 
meaning that there actually could be a negative correlation between GROWTH and 
SPOS, but in this study, we cannot claim that either is true. 
  
- D/E: There is a positive correlation and coefficient of the level of financial leverage and 
SPOS. This means that higher financial leverage characteristics of the firm, the more 
likely the firm will be to engage in SPOS. The correlation is slightly positive with the odds 
ratio 1.007, yet the ratio is not significant (p-value of .244). We cannot claim with 
reliability that it is a factor that explains the correlations in this model. 
  
- LISTED: A firm that is listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm is more likely to present SPOS. 
The odds ratio is 1.258 and, SPOS and LISTED are slightly positively correlated 
compared to a non-listed firm, but not at a significant level with the calculated p-value of 
.631. This means that because a firm is listed, it is probably indicating that the firm has 
SPOS but we cannot state this correlation for sure. 
 
- 2BIG4: And lastly, interpreting the results for 2BIG4, there is a negative correlation and 
coefficient of two Big 4 firms and SPOS, which signals that the presence of two Big 4 
firms performing the audit does not have a predominant effect on SPOS. As indicated by 
the odds ratio of .318, the two Big 4 is suggested to have a positive impact on AQ; 
however, the high p-value makes the result insignificant. The tendency for two Big 4 firms 
involved in the auditing process rather than one to impact the AQ is high, but not 
statistically significant.  
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5 Analysis 
In this chapter, a discussion of the results from chapter 4 is carried out. These results are compared to the 
literature review in three different stages. Firstly, an analysis of income smoothing, secondly, an analysis 
of SPOS, and lastly the chapter is concluded with a discussion of the effects the results have on joint 
audit. 
5.1 Income smoothing 
To test for income smoothing a hypothesis was formulated in section 2.6. Along with the results 
in chapter 4 it is possible to address the research question in section 1.3.1 and analyze the 
results by relating them to previous studies, seen in chapter 2.  
 
𝑯𝟏𝟎: 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑛-𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
 
The acquired results of income smoothing demonstrate that the variance is significantly elevated 
within the sample group of non-joint audits than within the group of joint audits. The findings 
indicate that the difference is aligned with our prediction that the variance will not be of equal 
value. This is evidence of, as Dechow et al. (2010) stated, a common corporate practice. 
Managers are not being held back by closer scrutiny. And as further stated, also by Dechow et 
al. (2010), it is difficult to define what other possible intentions for income smoothing are present. 
It is clearly not safe to state that firms that are being more closely scrutinized are showing less 
exposition to alternating the income. But, this finding could also be due to chance. It could simply 
be subject of non-opportunistic errors in estimating accruals (Barth et al., 2008). Given the not 
securely setting of robustness test or other quality test, it is not reliable to claim that our tested 
variables are the results we want to measure. 
 
A larger sample in the group of joint audit firms would give us a more comparable value on 
standard error on this test of variance of ∆NI/A, but we argue that our screening on size that 
gives us this matched sample provides a more comparable sample and hence on the more 
important aspect of standard deviation, which is directly derived from the variance. 
 
Our findings for this test indicate that the variance is higher among non-joint audit firms. This 
indicates that non-joint audit firms experience a higher quality of accounting, meaning that we 
can reject HP1. More specifically, we can accept the alternative hypothesis that voluntary joint 
audits will have more income smoothing than non-joint audit firms. The interpretation of the result is 
that a firm with higher variance is supposedly not interested in making the net income look smooth 
enough to manage the item. It is important to take into consideration that other studies have contained a 
greater number of proxies and moreover tested for a wider variability of proxies such as ∆NI scaled by 
∆CF and the Spearman correlation between accruals and cash flow. This reaches the boundaries of this 
study because our test is not all-encompassing. Another aspect of the reason for jointly audited firms to 
have more smoothed earnings is that of earnings persistence. One of the criticisms for the measurement of 
income smoothing is the request from the investors to have a persistently steady level of net income every 
year, as to facilitate better equity valuation models on the stock market. However, in this study we 
investigate the AQ, and in order to reach a persistent net income, the earnings need to be 
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smoothed, or manipulated, which would directly impose a violation on the quality of the 
accounting. 
 
Implications of this result are moreover indicating that it is not of any particular positive value for 
a firm to employ joint audit in order to achieve a higher AQ. Though this test is not enough to 
exclude that external factors do not have an influence on the outcome, yet we interpret this as a 
fail in attaining better results. As for other factors possible to affect AQ, we can mention trends in 
the industries and further macroeconomics. Another explanation for joint audit firms to have 
lower degree of AQ is due to the fact that the sample group of joint audit has a negative mean of 
ΔNI/A. According to the reverse causality issue it is difficult to determine which variable causes 
which when measuring correlations in statistical models. We cannot say for sure that joint audit 
actually causes a lower degree of AQ; we can only see that joint audit firms have a lower AQ. 
The motive for employing joint audit is for this study unknown, however, the negative ΔNI/A for 
joint audit firm indicates that these firms are not performing as well as the non-joint audit firms. 
One interpretation of this is that they are preparing for a better future with a more scrutinized and 
hopefully better accounting developed by two audit teams. 
 
As explained earlier in this study, there is a number of ways to measure AQ and our proxy for 
determining the level of income smoothing is highlighting one aspect of income smoothing. 
Measuring net income scaled by total assets gives an overall recital of the profitability adjusted 
by the size of the firm. An increase in net income should result in an increase in total assets and 
should be consistent, but if net income is more or less volatile, this could indicate that earnings 
are not being fairly compiled and attention should be paid to accuracy. A limitation of this test is 
the one-sidedness of it compared to prior research that has investigated two or three variables 
for the income smoothing proxy (Ahmed, et al., 2013, Barth et al., 2008; Lang et. al., 2003). 
Moreover, we do not analyze cash flows as a variable to play a role in the calculations of net 
income. There are a variety of ways a manager is able to adjust net income in order to fulfill 
various goals. Incentives for the managers can for example be exposing their best side, if not 
better than the truth, to investors and other stakeholders. 
5.2 SPOS 
Similarly, to the previous section this analysis commences with the hypothesis formulated in 
section 2.6 to test for SPOS in joint audit firms and ends in a discussion of the effect of the 
variables.  
 
𝑯𝟐𝟎: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆 
 
The results reached in the previous chapter were that SPOS is statistically significant with joint 
audit to the .05 level of significance. Thus, it is more likely for voluntary joint audit firms to have 
SPOS in their net income, resulting in the rejection of the null hypothesis 𝐻20. The indication of 
this is that the alternative null hypothesis is accepted, confirming a relationship between 
voluntary joint audit and SPOS. A negative relationship would indicate that joint audit is less 
inclined to SPOS, but the results reached the opposite, a positive sign. This means in our case, 
that joint audit does not have a positive effect on AQ, because a positive relationship signifies 
that joint audit firms are more inclined to have small positive earnings, and thus a lower degree 
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of AQ. The occurrence of SPOS suggests an earnings manipulation performed by the 
management; our findings suggest this behavior from firms which voluntarily employs joint audit.  
 
With the study of Burgstahler and Dichew (1997) in mind, this means that more joint audit 
employed firms are placed in the region just above breakeven. A jointly audited firm is more 
inclined to force their earnings to stay in positive numbers than a non-joint audit firm according to 
this study. The reason for this is difficult to identify within the scope of this research but a 
possible explanation could be in line with Beaver et al. (2007). That is, due to tax asymmetries 
that would be further explained by the tax-driven accounting in Sweden. Nevertheless, the 
earnings manipulation of SPOS works in both ways, to alter a negative result or to decrease the 
tax burden income. By this, the SPOS does not necessarily mean moving from a negative result 
to a meagre positive result, but could also indicate a reduction of a positive result to lower the 
tax burden or save profits for future difficult periods, yet still staying above zero.  
5.2.1 Effects of the variables 
In the methodology we expected a sign of “−” for JOINT (1,0) for indicating higher AQ, in the 
measure of this proxy. However, our results contradict the prediction and hence show a positive 
sign. The assumption in the methodology for joint audit would have led to higher AQ, and thus 
allocated the negative sign. From our result we hereby establish that joint audit does not lead to 
higher AQ. Moreover, the control variable of SIZE, as the logarithm of the value of total assets, 
suggests a minor negative relationship, by the odds ratio below 1, although not statistically 
significant. The lack of statistical significance together with a low correlation would lead us to the 
interpretation that SIZE is not a variable aiding to explain the correlation. Stating that SIZE does 
not influence the AQ would be the most likely of results, however the possibility of influence still 
exists, and the interpretation of the result would contradict previous study in the field. Cameran 
and Prencipe (2011) stated that a larger firm ought to be more inclined to indulge in earnings 
manipulation due to their assumed higher need for obtaining financial resources from external 
subjects. Our results, although not significant, contradict this statement and propose that size 
does not influence the AQ. Furthermore, this result also indicates that neither smaller firms are 
more or less inclined to earnings manipulation due to being less scrutinized and having less 
external pressures to meet certain financial goals. 
 
Moreover, the control variable GROWTH also did not live up to the expectations. Similarly to 
how the expectations from Bisogno and De Luca, (2016) were wrong we reached the same 
result. It suggests that firms with higher growth projections are not subjected to higher likelihood 
of earnings management. However, our results were not statistically significant and the odds 
ratio is close to 1, the conclusion drawn is that GROWTH cannot explain AQ in our model. 
 
D/E, the proxy for leverage shows a positive sign, as expected, although not statistically 
significant. D/E, the proxy for financial leverage shows a positive sign, as expected, although not 
statistically significant. The results suggest that firms with higher degree of financial leverage are 
more inclined to violate debt covenants, as suggested in Press et al. (1990), but due to the 
statistical insignificance we cannot state that a higher financial leveraged firm is more apt to 
earnings management such as SPOS.  
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The last two variables LISTED and 2BIG4 also show non-significant results. The likelihood of 
saying they are valid therefore diminishes, however the trend of the variables leads us to some 
interpretations. LISTED shows a positive correlation and an odds ratio above 1 which are 
against our expectations, if it were to be true, ignoring its high p-value, this would indicate that a 
listed firm has lower AQ than a non-listed firm. To draw this conclusion from the very high p-
value is however inconclusive, the result concluded is that LISTED does not explain whether the 
AQ increases or not. Moreover, 2BIG4 shows one of the strongest coefficients in our model and 
a low odds ratio, however as previously stated, it is not a significant result. To a degree of 73.8 
percent confidence, the presence of two Big 4 auditors is negatively correlated with SPOS, 
which means that they improve the AQ for the firm. The variable 2BIG4 showed a high 
correlation with JOINT in the correlation matrix, meaning that it does not further explain the 
occurrence of SPOS. This is due to the many joint audit firms using two Big 4 firms in the joint 
audit. The choice to keep this variable is to further emphasize the effect the Big 4 firms can 
induce on the AQ.  
 
The criticism of SPOS is that it can be explained by other factors. Dechow et al. (2010) 
presented the idea that discretionary accruals are not differentiated between small profit and 
small loss firms as an explanation of the occurrence of small profits, and Beaver et al. (2007) 
suggested that the SPOS can be explained by tax asymmetries. For this study, the proxy of 
SPOS is used to strengthen and explain the AQ together with the other proxy used, income 
smoothing. With the two proxies showing the same results we consider it reasonable to trust 
both and state that the AQ does not increase in a jointly audited firm. 
5.3 Joint Audit 
Of all the variables used in our model for SPOS, the only one showing a significant result is 
JOINT. Therefore, JOINT is the only variable we can statistically claim explains the 
measurement of AQ using the proxy SPOS. The results show that a firm employing joint audit is 
exposed to lower AQ than one with only one auditor. In the same line as Deng et al. (2014), we 
reach the conclusion that joint audits will have a negative effect. The arguments used by them 
suggest that a joint audit increases the risk for free rider problems. Despite the insignificant 
result, the control variable 2BIG4 would strengthen this argument. Our findings indicate that two 
Big 4 firms perform better AQ than otherwise, and according to Francis et al. (2009), the risk for 
free-riding is higher in an audit pair consisting of one Big 4 and one non-Big 4. It is challenging to 
prove that the shortcomings of the odd pair are due to free-riding, but it is one possible reason in 
line with previous findings. Other explanations for the lower AQ from joint audit could be the 
difficulty in cooperating between competitors, like Neveling (2007) states, the less productive 
interaction between two firms who are intended to collaborate but instead rely on the other, in 
line with Marmousez (2008), or further supporting the arguments of Velte and Azibi (2015): that 
in fact the joint audit is not better suited to stand up against managerial pressure. Nevertheless, 
we could have reached another result with a larger sample. Since the probability that the sample 
reflects the population is higher and therefore it is reliable to a higher degree. Also, the reliability 
on extracting significant results increases and the level of certainty increases with a larger 
sample. 
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In the literature review, several positive effects of joint audit were presented, however from the 
results reached in this study; these positive effects cannot be identified. We see no indication of 
an improvement from both the auditor needing to accept every decision, we see nothing 
suggesting the occurrence of avoiding both auditors to fail at the same time, and we see no sign 
of increased opposition against managerial pressure. Neither is any increased market 
competition identified, considering the high amount of two Big 4 auditor pairs in the Swedish 
context. The results showed that 84.38 percent of the Swedish firms employing joint audit used 
two Big 4 firms, not a suggestion of an increased market competition. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that jointly auditing involves a higher risk for free riding and that one of the 
auditors neglects its responsibility and relies on the other for doing all the work resulting in an 
overall worse AQ.   
 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the risk for reverse causality in the relationship between AQ 
and joint audit. From the example of Mankiw (2011) in the method we can draw the parallel with 
the variables in this study. The assumed upward slope between poorer AQ and the incidence of 
joint audit might lead one to conclude that the joint audit causes lower AQ, when in fact it might 
as well be the other way around. Joint audit could cause lower AQ; it could also be that lower 
AQ causes the need for joint audit. Mankiw (2011) described that the easy way to determine the 
course of causality is the examination of which variable move first. If we see an adoption to joint 
audit and then a decrease in AQ, we reach one conclusion. If we see a decrease in AQ and then 
the adoption to joint audit, we reach another. There is however a flaw with this approach, the 
change in behavior could be governed by expectations. A firm expecting a decrease in AQ could 
adopt joint audit to mitigate these anticipations. In this study no consideration is taken as to 
which type of firm has chosen joint audit or when. The results showed in chapter 4 do not 
explain why the joint audit is employed, thus it may not be true that a joint audit firm causes a 
lower variable change in net income nor is more inclined to produce a small profit earning. 
 
This study, on the contrary to many other studies (Lesage et al., 2012; El Assy, 2015; Bisogno 
and De Luca, 2016) investigating joint audits, has used more than one proxy for measuring 
accounting quality to try to fortify the analysis. But in the aim for identifying accounting quality, 
many obstacles appear. In this study the AQ has been measured in a relatively indirect manner, 
first using a proxy for earnings quality to later connect this with the AQ. Despite the flaws in 
previous studies using only one proxy, the use of two proxies in our study will not necessarily 
increase the accuracy of recognizing high quality accounting. As stated earlier in the analysis, 
there are flaws with the proxies in their natural form. To later accept the results from these to be 
a perfect measure of earnings quality would be rash, even worse would be to accept the 
measured earnings quality as a perfect indication for AQ. This adds to the quotation of Lang et 
al. (2003, p. 385): “Our conclusions are only as good as our methods.” The argumentation is 
however that these results are as good as it can be, using similar methods as previous studies in 
the field. 
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6 Conclusions 
First of all, “our conclusions are only as good as our methods.” (Lang et al., 2003, p. 385). AQ in 
terms of earnings management (income smoothing and SPOS) is particularly difficult to quantify 
and our attempt to control for external conditions may not surely show the best reflecting 
outcomes. Hence, AQ has been measured in a relatively indirect manner. From the proxies 
income smoothing and SPOS measuring earnings quality, this study provides measurements of 
accounting quality (AQ). The most important aspect in the measure of AQ has been joint audit 
and its effect on the quality, and attempt to answer the research question “How is accounting 
quality linked to joint audit?”  
 
This study has found that joint audit is negatively linked to AQ through a more frequent use of 
income smoothing and a higher tendency to manipulate earnings by the statistically positive 
significant correlation with SPOS. This concludes the study by establishing that joint audit has a 
negative connection to AQ. 
 
Swedish firms choosing to voluntarily apply joint audit do not seem to display a major 
improvement concerning AQ. In the proxy income smoothing we have discovered a higher 
variance among non-joint audit firms indicating that they are subjected to a higher degree of AQ, 
and thus a lower AQ among joint audit firms. We have found that a jointly audited firm smooths 
their earnings and despite being in line with the demand from the stock market for persistent 
earnings, this contradicts the main purpose of this study, measuring the AQ. A smoothed 
earning is a manipulated earning which from the accounting point of view decreases the quality.  
 
Additionally, the proxy SPOS presented the same results. The findings indicate a strongly 
positive correlation between SPOS and the variable for joint audit at a level of certainty of 95 
percent, meaning that more joint audit firms have produced small positive earnings. Besides joint 
audit, none of the control variables showed statistical significance indicating that they pose little 
to no effect on the model. When speculating the cause of the positive correlation between SPOS 
and joint audit, the Swedish tax context plays a possibly large role. SPOS does not have to 
indicate a loss being moved up to show a positive result, although being the most obvious, it can 
also signify a company reducing its earnings to save them for the future and hence alleviate tax 
expenses. The SPOS is a perilous measure of AQ, the occurrence can be due to many different 
factors, and however it does not remove the possibility of earnings manipulation. Nevertheless, 
all proxies for AQ possess an uncertain aspect being used in its indirect manner. In this study we 
have endeavored to mitigate other factors that affect AQ by using two proxies and reached the 
same conclusion for both, a negative link between joint audit and AQ. 
 
When studying the correlation between variables, other issues come across. We argue that the 
negative link between AQ and joint audit does not necessarily mean that joint audit decreases 
the AQ, other reasons for this can arise. The negative correlation does not represent that joint 
audit causes a lower AQ. As with the reverse causality issue it might as well be the other way 
around; that low AQ causes the need for joint audit. Firms could have employed the joint audit 
after being subject to low AQ for several years and attempt to remove this problem.  
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This study adds to the research results showing implications that the employment of joint audit 
does not induce a positive value to the financial reports. Previous studies declining the benefits 
of joint audit presents mainly the risk for jeopardized collaboration between the two firms, either 
if it is free rider problems, the competitive position, or reliance on the partner firm for doing all the 
work. Our study supports these findings, suggesting that the ordinary accounting of non-joint 
kind produces higher AQ. Especially the free rider problem is presented as a larger risk in a joint 
audit. Although not being statistically significant, the 2BIG4 variable resulted in a strongly 
negative correlation with SPOS, suggesting they would produce a higher AQ and not be 
subjected to free riding. This further adds to the findings of Francis et al. (2009) that an audit pair 
consisting of one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 imposes a higher risk for free riding.  
6.1 Future research 
As for future areas to research there are some propositions that have crossed our minds while 
realizing this study. Firstly, since our results show that joint audit does not contribute to higher 
AQ, is it of no use to apply joint audits or is the case simple that the firms with lower quality 
accounting try to improve the quality by hiring an additional audit team? Maybe our primary 
perceptions of the topic joint audit are applied by other reasons that we first perceived. This 
leads onto a second question focusing more profoundly on the reason for choosing to apply joint 
audit. Are there other factors that provoke the need for an additional audit team? 
 
Another reason for research on the topic is the more basic question, who does apply joint audit? 
Since the requirement for joint audit was suspended in Denmark, why do firms still apply joint 
audit? Is the employment of joint audit more widespread in a certain industry? Also, regarding 
reverse causality issue, is it possible that the relationship between joint audit and accounting 
quality is reversed?  
 
Furthermore, we have discovered that some other studies have applied both a wider range of 
proxies and a larger sample of joint audit firms. So, we want to encourage to perform our test but 
with a wider range of proxies and a larger sample in order to confirm our results.   
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